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Public Policy for Agriculture After Commodity Programs 
The Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 opted for the 
market rather than the government to allocate resources and set returns in agriculture. A modest 
safety net of marketing loans and crop insurance remains but the era in which government 
managed the supply of major crops appears to be ending. 
The objective of this paper is to consider appropriate public policy for American 
agriculture without supply-control programs. We discuss options for policies addressing key 
concerns: economic efficiency, equity, the environment, instability, the family farm, and rural 
communities. The discussion is suggestive, not exhaustive, and is intended to stimulate thinking 
on how post-commodity program policy might better serve the needs of agriculture and the 
public at large. 
The Changing Agricultural Policy Paradigm 
Table 1 shows elements of the old and new paradigm for public policy toward 
agriculture. We define the paradigm in terms of its central concepts, underlying beliefs, political 
situation, and resulting public policies. 
Central Concepts 
Central to the old paradigm was the concept of agriculture in chronic econom1c 
disequilibrium. Disequilibrium were viewed as the result of (1) rapid technological advances 
increasing output and saving labor (Cochrane), (2) slowly increasing demand (Houthakker), and 
(3) cyclical demand (Schultz) acting on an industry characterized by limited ability to adjust 
(Johnson and Quance). Consequently, agriculture was characterized by excess production 
capacity (production chronically exceeding what the market could absorb at politically and/or 
socially acceptable prices), excess operator and family labor, and persistent low rates of return 
even for commercial farming resources. 
Table 1. Old and New Public Policy Paradigm for Agriculture. 
OLD PARADIGM NEW PARADIGM 
Central Concepts 
Chronic economic disequilibrium Approximate long-term economic equilibrium 
• Excess production capacity • Importance of off-farm income 
• Excess labor • Economic efficiency 
• Chronic low rates of return • International competitiveness 
Underlying Beliefs 
Farm fundamentalism 
Agriculture as family-farm way of life 
Market failure 
Food security through government 
Democratic capitalism 
Agriculture as big business 
Government failure 
Food security through private sector 
Political Situation 
Pivotal popular vote at margin 
United agricultural establishment 
Hold key Congressional leadership 
Weakened plebiscite power 
Fragmented interest groups 
Increased reliance on monetary contribution 
Public Policies 
Public stabilization of markets and incomes 
• Income transfers tied to production base 
• Supply control 
• Demand expansion (e.g., export, ethanol 
subsidies) 
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Economy-wide economic growth 
Provide public goods and correct externalities 
Conditional safety net 
In contrast, the new paradigm views the agricultural economy as near long-term 
economic equilibrium in which rates to return on resources on reasonably well-managed 
commercial farms are comparable to rates of return elsewhere except for transitory deviations 
(Tweeten, ch. 4). Furthermore, agriculture is capable of adjusting to shocks so that chronic 
intervention by government is not needed for reasonably well-managed commercial farms to earn 
returns as high as their resources would earn elsewhere. 
In 1994, a reasonably representative recent year, income of all U.S. households averaged 
$43,133 while income of farm households averaged $44,140 (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
December 1995, p. 4). Farm and nonfarm households have similar incomes largely because 
farmers and their families have transferred their excess labor off the farm - either as part-time 
farmers or by leaving the farm for other work. Off-farm income comprised 88 percent of total 
income of farm households in 1993, 1994, and 1995 (U.S. Department of Agriculture, December 
1995, p. 31 ). For most farm families, farm income is not of much consequence. 
A central concept of approximate long-term economic equilibrium carries with it the 
corollary that economic efficiency will result from competitive private markets with a supporting 
government providing public goods and correcting externalities. Such efficiency ensures 
competitiveness in a global economy increasingly open to trade. 
Underlying Beliefs 
A cornerstone of the old paradigm belief system was farm fundamentalism. It viewed the 
family farm as an essential part of our national heritage which must be preserved (see Tweeten, 
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p. 77). Agriculture was synonymous with family farmers pursuing a way of life. Another 
cornerstone, largely coming from the Great Depression, was that government intervention was 
justified because market failure was viewed as common even for rival and exclusionary goods 
such as farm commodities. This belief was one reason government was charged with 
safeguarding food security by diverting acres and storing commodities. 
In contrast, the public under the new paradigm increasingly views agriculture as big 
business. This belief justifies "mainstreaming"- treating agriculture the same as other business 
sectors. With many Americans holding the populist belief that "big is bad and small is 
beautiful," farmers will find economic rents more difficult to obtain from taxpayers. Farmers 
will find the public more willing to use the stick rather than the carrot to correct externalities. 
With the failure of communism and the success of market economies such as Chile and 
Hong Kong, democratic capitalism has received new respectability. Democratic capitalism 
emphasizes the efficiency of the private sector for establishing prices through supply and demand 
for market goods. Although the public values government intervention to improve private 
market efficiency, it recognizes that special interests, bungling, and other shortcomings make 
government failure at least as great a threat as market failure. This recognition constrains 
government intervention. 
Political Situation 
The political process translates concepts and beliefs into public policy. Agriculture is 
confronted with not only a new set of concepts and beliefs, but also a new role of agriculture in 
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the political process. Under the old paradigm, agriculture had enough political votes to be an 
important player in the political coalition that governed the country. Furthermore, the 
agricultural establishment mostly cooperated with other policy actors to further the legislative 
agenda of each member. For example, land grant colleges of agriculture provided intellectual 
justification for income transfers to commercial agriculture and commercial agriculture 
supported research and extension funds for land grant colleges. Environmentalists supported 
commodity programs and farm groups supported environmental measures as long as farmers 
were paid rather than mandated to protect the environment. And legislators were compensated 
for their part with campaign contributions and votes. 
The new paradigm recognizes declining agricultural political strength from a falling farm 
population and a declining relative contribution to aggregate economic activity. Fewer key 
Congressional committee chairs and other legislative leaders are coming from farm states. In 
many states, agriculture has too few votes to decide even fairly close elections. The political 
base is weakened if farmers no longer view land grant colleges as useful to preserve commodity 
programs, farm interests view environmental measures as a threat, and if food stamps are 
combined with other welfare assistance and administered by the Department of Health and 
Human Services or by states. Political power has fragmented among specialized commodity 
groups as farms have become more specialized and bifurcated into a few large farms producing 
most farm output and many small operations accounting for most farms. These specialized 
commodity groups often have competing, rather than complementary agendas. An example is 
that high grain prices, desired by crop organizations, are not viewed favorably by livestock 
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organizations. 
With agriculture viewed as businesses rather than family farms and with erosion of farm 
fundamentalist attitudes among the public, agriculture will depend less on plebiscite political 
power- with legislators voting for farmers because their urban constituency insists (Table 1). 
Instead, agriculture's political behavior will become more like nonfarm corporate business -
using campaign contributions and direct links to members of Congress to influence legislation. 
Public Policies 
As might be expected, changing concepts, beliefs, and political reality give rise to 
changing public policy prescriptions (Table 1). The old paradigm emphasizing entitlements 
(e.g., income transfers to farmers), supply controls, demand expansion, and public stabilization 
of markets is giving way. The new paradigm holds that the role of government is to promote 
broad-based economic growth, supply public goods, internalize externalities, and provide a 
conditional safety net for the disadvantaged. The safety net will no longer pay farmers not to 
produce, will be more class (e.g., poor) than sector oriented. 
Components of public policy for agriculture under the new paradigm are discussed in 
more detail in the following sections. The fact that much of the following discussion is about 
government policy should not veil the reality that allocation of most agricultural goods and 
services will be left to the private sector. 
6 
Removing Barriers to Economic Efficiency and Growth 
Because farmers derive so much of their income off the farm and because over time 
incomes of farm and nonfarm people tend to equalize, it follow that in a post·commodity 
program world of exposure to market forces, incomes of farmers will be determined by incomes 
of nonfarmers. Thus progress in raising the incomes of farmers will depend on national 
economic growth and the availability of and earnings from off.farm employment. This 
highlights the importance to farmers of broad-based national economic growth and efficiency 
(Table 1). Economy-wide economic progress requires that the government removes economic 
distortions. The FAIR bill, NAFTA, and the Uruguay Trade Round reduced market 
interventions for agriculture and the nation, but numerous trade and commodity distortions 
remam. Examples within the U.S. agricultural sector are the sugar, tobacco, and peanut 
programs.1 
Monopoly power distorts marginal prices. Concern has been expressed about market 
distortion and exploitation of farmers by, among others, meat packers and vertically integrated 
livestock and poultry contractors. While there is no evidence of systematic exploitation of 
farmers or distortion of prices by agribusiness, a case can be made for continued monitoring of 
the situation (see Tweeten, ch. 8). An emerging issue is possible monopoly power of very large 
farms, some vertically coordinated under integrated ownership or production and marketing 
contracts. This issue is of particular concern at the local level. 
Policy reform options are not confmed to agriculture- the need is to encourage national 
economic progress to benefit farm and nonfarm people alike. With agriculture receiving much 
smaller subsidies from the federal government, it has a much greater stake in ensuring sound 
macroeconomic policy. 
A key consideration m enhancing economic growth is increased national savmgs. 
Options for raising savings rates include eliminating full employment federal deficits, ending 
double taxation of corporate earnings, and privatizing social security. Full employment federal 
deficits are called dissavings because they utilize mostly for consumption the funds that savers 
(who finance the debt) would invest in productive private human and material capital. Thus 
lower deficits increase national savings, investment, and long-term economic growth. 
Corporations are a bright spot of high savings rates in an American economy 
characterized by very low personal savings rates. Among all taxes, those on corporate profit 
provide some of the highest deadweight costs (foregone national income) per dollar of taxes 
(Ballard et a!.). Thus, taxing corporate profits only once and at the individual investor's tax rate 
would promote economic efficiency as well as savings. Chile and other countries have shown 
that privatizing of social security can replace a pay-as-you-go retirement system, sharply raise 
savings, and give citizens a stake in sound macroeconomic policies. 
Provision of Public Goods and Internalizing Externalities 
Public goods are a special case of externalities, which are defined as a divergence 
between marginal private and social costs (benefits). Markets work best for rival and 
exclusionary goods, externalities exist for goods which are at least partially nonrival and/or 
nonexclusionary, and pure public goods are unequivocally nonrival and nonexclusionary. When 
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goods are nonexclusionary, firms are unable to appropriate marginal social benefits, i.e., private 
marginal benefits accrued by firms fall short of marginal social benefits. Thus too little of the 
good is produced by private firms. When goods are nonrival, consumption by one consumer 
does not diminish consumption available to another consumer. Marginal cost is zero. If firms 
set price above marginal cost to cover expenses, private cost exceeds social cost (measured by 
foregone output of other goods and services) and again too little of the good is produced. 
Economic efficiency and growth are served by provision for public goods and services 
such as infrastructure and information systems. Research, education, the environment, 
instability, the family farm, and rural communities all have externality dimensions appropriate to 
address in public policy. 
Research 
A typical rate of return on private conventional investment in the farm and nonfarm 
sectors is 10 percent (Malkiel). In contrast, rates of return on public agricultural research and 
extension (Rand E) range from 27 percent to 93 percent (Table 2). Many estimates cluster in the 
40-50 percent range. 
Estimates by Chavas and Cox and by Makki et al. (1994) are significant departures from 
traditional methodology (Table 2). Both studies attempt to correct shortcomings of previous 
estimates, and both show lower rates of return for public and private R and E than found in most 
other studies. Even these lower returns (approximately 27 percent) on public R and E 
substantially exceed typical private returns and hence justify additional investment Such effort 
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could promote food security, international competitiveness, and economic equity by lowering 
resource costs of food. 
Table 2. Internal Rates of Return to Public and Private Investments to Raise Productivity of 
American Agriculture. 
Time Period Public Pnvate R&D Estimation Procedure 
R&E 
------------Percent------------
Makki, Thraen, and Tweeten (1994) 1930-90 27 6 Cointegration/ECM 
Makki and Tweeten (1993) 1930-90 93 45 Polynomial distributed Lag 
Huffinan and Evenson (1993) 1950-82 41 46 Zellner's SUR 
Chavas and Cox (1992) 1950-82 28 17 Non parametric 
Huffman and Evenson (1989) 1949-74 62 o• Zellner's SUR 
Braha and Tweeten (1986) 1939-82 50 b Polynomial distributed Lag 
Davis (1981) 1964-74 28-52 b Polynomial distributed Lag 
Knutson and Tweeten (1979) 1969-72 28-35 b Polynomial distributed Lag 
Cline (1975) 1939-72 41-50 b Polynomial distributed Lag 
Griliches (1964) 1949-59 300 b Production Function 
•Estimates were slightly negative or near zero. 
"No estimate available. 
Education 
Rates of return also are favorable on public elementary and secondary schooling for farm 
and nonfann persons (Tweeten and Brinkman, pp. 126-129; Council of Economic Advisors, p. 
203). Despite evidence of aggregate benefits from more schooling investment, specific practices 
to improve quality of schooling often are not successful? An even surer route to enhance student 
achievement is greater quantity of schooling, for example by lengthening the school year by one 
month or by adding another hour to each school day. 
On efficiency and equity grounds, a case can be made for greater federal funding of 
education. Spillovers across school district boundaries distort incentives and create inequities in 
funding education. Approximately one-third of Americans live in a state other than where they 
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received their education - a figure that has not changed much in several decades based on an 
earlier study by Hines and Tweeten and more recent data reported by the Council of Economic 
Advisors (p. 209). Many students take their state and local investment in education to generate 
earnings and taxes in another state. Poor school districts and states with high net outmigration 
rates are often rural and experience the greatest loss of hard-earned investment in schooling. 
While the U.S. is better off from the education provided by schools in these areas, the local areas 
are actually worse off in many instances. Compensation for net spillovers and attendant 
promotion of equity and efficiency in schooling would require the federal government to fund a 
larger share of common schooling costs. It currently pays 7 percent of elementary and secondary 
schooling costs compared to 10 percent in 1980 (Council of Economic Advisors, p. 209). Some 
possible sources of funds are listed later. 
Environment 
Environmental problems of agriculture include soil loss, water and food quality, 
agricultural nuisances, and species preservation. The Environmental Protection Agency will 
continue to address problems of point-source pollution and associated air and water quality 
problems on large livestock farms. Attention here is on nonpoint-source water quality and soil 
erosion problems. 
Commodity programs covering only one-third of all farms and one-half of the nation's 
land in farms (Padgitt, p. 49) are an inadequate delivery system for environmental programs. 
However, potential termination of commodity programs raises difficult issues of what, if any, 
11 
public policy is needed to follow up the sodbuster, swampbuster, conservation compliance, and 
water quality features of existing commodity programs. We propose two options to replace these 
environmental features of commodity programs, the Conservation Reserve Program, and the 
Wetland Reserve Program: (1) an Environmental Compliance Program (ECP), and (2) a 
Cropland Environmental Easement Program (CEEP). These would supplement and not replace 
current Environmental Protection Agency programs and Natural Resources Conservation Service 
programs of technical assistance and cost sharing. 
The ECP would be similar to but broader than Conservation Compliance. It would 
require a plan for all land in farms on all U.S. farms by a prescribed date and then 
implementation by a later prescribed date. To be manageable, it would initially address mostly 
soil erosion.3 In time, ECP might be extended to address water quality issues including synthetic 
chemicals, livestock manure disposal practices, filter strips, protection of stream banks, and the 
like. 
ECP would be voluntary, financed by "green payments" from the government, or it could 
be mandatory. The attraction of green payments is that they would use the carrot rather than the 
stick to bring compliance. Green payments would maintain the long tradition of compensating 
producers for environmental measures deemed to serve the public interest. 
An important constraint on identifying and implementing appropriate environmental 
programs is the inability of economists to calculate social benefits and costs of environmental 
measures with acceptable accuracy. Existing measures sometimes exceed and sometimes they 
fall short of appropriate public action. Improved models built for watersheds with detail for 
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individual farms are needed to allow more careful selection of environmental policies and to 
compensate losers. The difficulty of trying to tax operators based on how much environmental 
harm they do or subsidizing operators based on how much environmental good they do has 
prompted a search for alternatives to green payments. 
An option would be to require ECP of all operators in keeping with Napier's contention 
that " ... [compulsory approaches] will be required to motivate a significant number of land 
operators to adopt and continue using farming systems that minimize degradation of 
environmental quality." But only operators with problems above a certain threshold would have 
to implement a preventive plan. Several reasons for requiring compliance are listed below. 
(1) Modem conservation tillage practices (including no-till) have greatly reduced the cost 
of protecting the environment from soil erosion while maintaining farm productivity and profits 
(Hopkins et al. ). In many cases the operator is only being asked to do what increases his income 
and saves his soil- actions in his self interest but currently not done because of lethargy, lack of 
knowledge, or other reasons. Millions of acres once classified as "highly erodible" can now be 
cropped with conservation tillage at tolerable erosion rates. 
(2) Requiring environmental compliance reduces "taking." An operator has reason to 
control soil erosion that is reducing his net income and net worth. But over half the costs of soil 
erosion are not borne on-site but instead are borne by "downstream" parties subject to 
sedimentation or chemical contamination of their farmland, streams, urban reservoirs, and the 
like (Ribaudo). Thus the farmer allowing erosion is "taking" from downstream parties. If he 
does not have to pay for such taking, downstream damage is an externality unlikely to change his 
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behavior. The ECP requires the operator to stop doing what he should not be doing - taking 
someone else's property. 
(3) ECP is efficient public policy because of the high cost and administrative difficulty 
of monitoring non-point source effluents. 
( 4) Requiring compliance would bring agriculture in line with standard procedures 
applied to other industries. This more uniform public policy environment could create more 
efficiency in the allocation of private investment capital among industries. 
How to enforce ECP would be a delicate issue. As a start, the only penalty on violators 
might be denial of federal program benefits including catastrophic insurance and disaster 
payments. If that does not bring sufficient compliance, enforcement using approaches employed 
for other industries could be instituted. It is important to note that over half of all cropland has 
already met requirements of the Conservation Compliance Program, easing problems of 
compliance for the ECP. 
The companion Cropland Environmental Easement Program would compensate those 
who would experience a significant loss of earnings (taking) from implementing the ECP. CEEP 
would have similarities to the Conservation Reserve Program but would concentrate more 
narrowly on highly erodible cropland that cannot achieve an acceptable erosion rate even with 
modem conservation tillage. It would also include acres in unique wildlife habitat and the 
Wetland Reserve to compensate for "taking" of cropland for filter strips and other water quality 
control purposes. Perpetual and 30-year easements would be offered and the program could be 
limited to (say) 30 million acres. To reduce economic and taxpayer costs, easements would 
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allow haying, grazing, recreation, wildlife habitat, trees, or other noncropping uses consistent 
with soil and water protection and species preservation. 
Other efforts ordinarily not viewed as environmental programs will continue. An 
example is agricultural research and development which has played an important role in allowing 
the nation to supply its food and fiber needs on only one-fifth of the nation's land area. 
Continued improvements in technology will hold down requirements for cropland, thereby 
freeing land to be used for species preservation, forests, recreation, and other purposes favored 
by society. 
Instability 
Economic instability, long a major economic problem for commercial agriculture, may be 
an even larger problem in the absence of deficiency payments and substantial government 
reserves of grain stocks and set aside acres. Presence of a problem is not a prima facia case for 
government intervention, however, as explained below. 
Instability has dimensions of income security for producers and food security for 
consumers. An important issue regarding food security is market imperfections interfering with 
the ability of the private sector alone to hold sufficient buffer food stocks: 
• Because of high risks faced by an individual firm that average out for the government, 
the private discount rate is higher than the public discount rate. This keeps private firms from 
holding socially optimal reserves. 
• The public may be highly risk averse to food shortages. Carryover buffer stocks of 
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U.S. wheat would be only 400 million bushels in a well-functioning market with risk-neutral 
stockholders according to estimates of Makki et al. (1995, p. 31 ). If the private market acts as if 
consumers are risk neutral when in fact they are highly risk averse, the result is inadequate 
reserves. 
• Americans have a tradition of responding to humanitarian food needs at home and 
abroad. The private sector is unlikely to hold reserves to deal with the rare catastrophic world 
food crisis. Such an event is especially likely to leave the third world short of food as available 
supplies are consumed by more wealthy countries. 
• Finally, the fear that governments might intervene in markets in ways that reduce 
profits from storage is self-fulfilling. Private firms will not hold adequate reserves if the 
government threatens to embargo exports or control prices (profits) in times of short food 
supplies. This concern creates a buffer stock vacuum the government may feel compelled to fill. 
On the other hand, governments do not have a good record of managing stocks 
(Gunasekera and Fisher). They frequently change the rules for acquisition and release. The 
resulting uncertainty reduces the willingness of the private trade to hold stocks. Furthermore, the 
U.S. has massive reserves to buffer almost any food supply-demand shock by exporting less, by 
importing more, or by consuming grains directly rather than through livestock. Hence buffer 
stocks above those held by the private trade are primarily for consumers in low income countries. 
These consumers often do not have sufficient private income or access to government programs, 
such as food stamps, which allow them to purchase food security in the market place. 
Under the FAIR bill, the Security Wheat Reserve was renamed the Food Security 
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Commodity Reserve. Rice, com, and sorghum, along with wheat were made eligible for the 
reserve. The reserve cap of 4 million tons was retained by the FAIR act. Wheat can be used for 
food or feed but adding feed grains dilutes the ability of the reserve to respond to food shortages 
in the third world. A middle ground between massive reserve capacity frequently held by 
governments since World War II and laissez faire is merely to expand an emergency wheat and 
rice reserve beyond the current 4 million tons. That is a relatively low cost and unobtrusive way 
to provide food security, especially in response to acute food shortages affecting developing 
countries. 
In contrast to public buffer stocks mainly for consumers, public insurance of crops, 
revenue, or net farm income is mainly an issue for American producers (and taxpayers). A 
justification for public insurance is an externality- a family farm is prized more by society than 
by the market. However, most noncommercial farm families are protected from farm income 
risks by their off-farm income. Most commercial farm families can afford to pay for their own 
insurance. Thus few farm families would seem to warrant subsidized insurance against risks, 
especially when the difference between success and failure comes at a considerable cost to 
taxpayers. 
The case for taxpayers bearing the cost of farm risk is further undermined by widespread 
mismanagement of public insurance and disaster programs. Furthermore, government financed 
crop or revenue insurance has an unfortunate tendency to get more of what society does not want 
but pays for - unstable production and more farming in high risk areas with fragile ecosystems. 
In addition, nowhere in the world have producers been willing to pay premiums essential for 
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economically viable all-risk private crop insurance.4 Part of the problem is inability of insurers 
to adequately deal with adverse selection, moral hazard, and the risk of widespread crop failure 
from bad weather. Also, all-risk private insurance is not viable partly because many farmers are 
not risk averse or are clever at devising alternative, cheaper risk-reducing strategies such as self 
insurance through storage of previous crops and accumulation of financial resources. 
Government-assisted insurance faces similar obstacles. 
Despite criticisms, some type of subsidized insurance is likely to continue for agriculture 
after year 2002, especially if subsidized insurance is chosen as the policy tool to ensure 
participation in environmental compliance programs. It is well to draw on the varied Canadian 
experience with government programs especially designed to address farm risk (U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, November 1995, pp. 24-28). Several Canadian provinces are adopting the Net 
Income Stabilization Account (NISA). Meanwhile, the Gross Revenue Insurance Program 
(GRIP) is being phased out in Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia because of its cost. 
NISA is somewhat like an Investment Retirement Account (IRA) which can be drawn on when 
net farm income is low. 5 
NISA provides several advantages: 
• Significant stabilization of net farm income, not just of price, production, production 
expenses, or gross revenue. 
• Ease of administration (could be done by the IRS in the U.S.) 
• Cost-effectiveness of public funds in reducing variation in net farm income. 
• Encouragement to save. 
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NISA also has strong disadvantages. The account must be built by each farmer; funds are 
not pooled. An unfortunate tum of events could create a need to draw on the fund before it has 
had time to build or after it has been depleted. By modifying the program to accentuate 
advantages and to reduce disadvantages, a NISA-type effort offers significant potential 
advantages. A program built on all net income rather than just farm net income and administered 
by IRS could help farmers to protect net income at low cost to taxpayers. 
The Family Farm and Rural Farm Communities 
Farmers and rural people retain unique social characteristics prized by society (Drury and 
Tweeten, 1995b ). In 1986, 82 percent of a random sample of all adult Americans agreed with the 
statement that "the family farm must be preserved because it is a vital part of our heritage" 
(Jordan and Tweeten). While family farms and rural communities seem to possess positive 
externalities (social value in excess of monetary value), the difference appears to be small based 
on revealed political preferences. That is, the modest annual public outlays for rural 
development and farm programs under the FAIR bill suggest the public is unwilling to pay much 
to preserve family farms and rural farm communities. Another interpretation is that the small 
outlays reflect public recognition that current (past) programs do not preserve this heritage. 
Family farms and rural farm communities left mostly to market forces will continue to 
fade as family farms slowly exit due to technological change and a variety of other reasons. 6 
Current efforts will not stem that fade partly because programs to preserve prime farmland and 
promote rural development often work at cross purposes. Low interest federal loans and grants 
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subsidize rural utilities. These plus subsidies to mail delivery, school busing, and housing 
encourage nonfarm developmental sprawl into the countryside where hobby farmers compete· 
with other farmers for land. Losing farmland to developmental sprawl effectively removes the 
option of bringing it back to farming if needed some day to produce food. Loss of this option 
may be regarded as a negative externality, inappropriate to encourage with "rural development" 
subsidies. Before attempting draconian measures such as strict zoning or regulation forbidding 
conversion of prime farmland to other uses, it is well to promote preservation by terminating 
community service subsidies that promote developmental sprawl. Given greater public than 
private value in preserving farmland, a useful additional option is for public and private entities 
dedicated to farmland preservation to expand purchases of development rights from farmland 
owners. 
Economic Equity and the Safety Net 
People on small farms and in rural communities have a special stake in programs to 
reduce poverty and inequality because a disproportionate share have low incomes and are the 
working poor. Rural counties account for 21 percent of the nation's population but for 25 
percent of the nation's poor and 30 percent of the nation's working poor (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, February 1995). 
Even as the disparity in incomes between farm and nonfarm America is narrowing, the 
disparity of income between upper and lower income Americans is growing. The share of wealth 
held by the richest 1 percent of Americans increased from 22 percent in 1979 to 42 percent in 
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1992 (Mobility in America, p. 30). Despite President Clinton's efforts at tax reform and creating 
economic opportunity for the disadvantaged, the percent of income held by the top 5 percent of 
earners went from 18 percent when he took office to 21 percent in early 1996 (Mobility in 
America, p. 30). 
Technological change, freer trade, less labor union strength, and illegal immigration have 
been blamed for the growing dispersion in income among Americans. Freer trade creates 
earnings disparities by rewarding those with the education and/or talents for high technology and 
pop culture industries of comparative advantage while exposing American workers in labor 
intensive industries to competition from lower cost labor in developing countries. American 
manufacturing industries such as textiles are especially affected. The wage of the lowest-paid 10 
percent of workers has fallen in real terms since 1979 (Mobility in America, p. 33). The 
seemingly permanent underclass is disproportionately associated with single parenting, public 
welfare, school dropouts, drug addiction, crime, and prison populations. 
The cost to middle and upper class Americans from social pathologies attending low 
income is huge. It includes direct and indirect costs for crime, security, incarceration, medical 
care, and the like. Thus the widening distribution of income may be view as an externality -
social costs exceed private costs of America's relatively open economy, now extended to 
agriculture in the FAIR bill. The existence of externalities gives Americans of means more than 
altruistic reasons to raise living standards of low income families and individuals. 
Furthermore, Blue and Tweeten and Tweeten and Mlay find that a typical American 
family with a very low income receives 50 percent more utility from an additional dollar of 
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income than does a family with average income. On the other hand, a family receiving five 
times the national mean income is estimated to derive only one-fifth as much utility from an 
additional dollar of income as a family with average income. Of course, personal values and 
incentives for economic efficiency, savings, and investment must be accounted for in 
redistribution policies. 
Finding politically and socially acceptable policies to narrow the distribution of income is 
not easy in an era of budget stringency and doubts about the competence of government to 
administer programs. One approach to the problem is to force firms to pay higher wages and 
retain workers. Several Western European countries have done this at huge cost in 
unemployment and lost output. 
A wage supplement is an alternative program to promote economic equity without 
marked loss of economic efficiency. The supplement would harness the efficiency of the private 
market and is consistent with the work ethic. The many low-skilled, low education, low paid 
workers residing in rural areas (including hired farm workers) would especially benefit from the 
program. 
The supplement would pay (say) 60 percent of the difference between a target wage of 
(say) $10 per hour and the wage a person actually receives from an employer. For a worker 
worth only $2 per hour to an employer, the wage of $2 would be supplemented by a payment of 
0.6($1 0-$2) or $4.80 per hour for total earnings of $6.80 per hour. Income of a worker employed 
2,000 hours per year would total $13,600. At that rate, two workers in a family would bring 
overall family income well above the poverty threshold. 
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Among other advantages, the wage supplement could: 
• Expand unemployment of disadvantaged people, unlike raising the minimum wage 
which puts disadvantaged people out of work. Ability to pay a low wage to low-skill workers 
gives firms more flexibility to provide on-the-job training, the major source of vocational-
technical education. Experience builds better work habits and skills, allowing wage supplement 
recipients to move up to more lucrative employment. The wage supplement does more to 
encourage hours of work than does the Earned Income Tax Credit which could be retained for 
low income salaried or self-employed workers. A family could claim either the wage 
supplement or Earned Income Tax Credit, but not both. 
• Encourage disadvantaged workers with a high reservation wage to be employed. Many 
potential workers today reject low wage work in favor of unemployment or welfare. 
• Encourage workers to seek and receive the highest private wage possible because (for 
the example above) each additional $1 per hour earned from employers loses only 60 cents of 
supplement. 
• Allow American marginal workers and firms to better compete globally with third-
world labor without the nation resorting to costly trade barriers. 
• Create incentives to complete high school if the supplement is unavailable to a dropout 
until (say) 20 years of age. 
At issue is how such a supplement would be financed. Some of the financing would 
come from lower conventional welfare and law enforcement spending. Other potential funding 
sources include an end to tax-exempt bonds, limiting home mortgage interest deductions, and a 
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tax on fossil fuels to improve air quality, encourage energy efficiency, reduce dependence on 
foreign oil, and conserve resources.7 Another alternative is a value added tax (VAT) which has 
low deadweight cost per dollar of taxes. Billions of tax dollars also could be saved by indexing 
government benefits such as social security to a price index that, unlike the current CPI, does not 
overestimate inflation. 
Conclusions 
For much of the 20th century, agriculture existed in a policy paradigm rooted in chronic 
excess production capacity. Farm commodity programs not only cushioned but attenuated 
adjustments to an industrialized agriculture. Now, excess labor and other resources are minimal. 
Household incomes of farmers and nonfarmers with similar resource levels will follow similar 
paths in the future. With agriculture closer to long-term economic equilibrium, agriculture will 
operate under a new policy paradigm in the 21st century. Within this new paradigm, public 
policy toward agriculture will be rooted in stimulating economy-wide growth, providing public 
goods, correcting externalities, and providing a conditional safety net. 
Under the old paradigm, it was difficult for farm groups to advise sound economic 
policies when following that advice would "hoist farmers on their own petard" of lost subsidies. 
With an end to supply control and to major transfers of income from taxpayers to farmers, 
farmers now have a greater stake in and can be more nearly unequivocal advocates for sound 
economic policies contributing to broad-based national economic growth. 
Greater attention can be given to low cost sources of food and international 
competitiveness - funding public agricultural research and eliminating trade and other market 
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distortions. Commodity programs, once central to correct externalities regarding the 
environment and instability, no longer will be satisfactory delivery vehicles. Several options 
were proposed: Environmental Compliance Program (ECP) to bring sound environmental 
practices to all farmland, a Cropland Environmental Easement Program (CEEP) by "buy out" 
environmental degradation on cropland with severe soil erosion or water quality problems, and a 
net income stabilization program patterned after Canada's Net Income Stabilization Program 
(NISA) to dampen variation in net income of farmers at low administrative and taxpayer cost. 
Despite progress, farms and rural communities contain a disproportionate share of the 
poor, many of them working poor. Thus, residents of farms, rural communities, and cities have a 
stake not just in policies raising national income but also in policies addressing poverty, 
underemployment, widening distribution of income, and social disintegration. A wage 
supplement was proposed herein to promote economic equity as well as growth. 
Finally, commercial farming has moved beyond industrialization, characterized by mass 
production of standardized commodities, to the post-industrial era of service industries and 
occupations emphasizing information systems, finance, insurance, management, and marketing. 
Precision application of inputs and precision production of output to meet varied demands will 
be central to survival in a post-industrial era of advanced science, high teclmology, and 
specialized management. Farm operators and families will emphasize acquisition of skills and 
strategies to succeed in this post-industrial era rather than chase more transfers from taxpayers. 
That means greater private and public investment in human resource development, including 
changes in funding to recognize spillover of benefits among entities that finance schools. 
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Endnotes 
1The minimum wage is another example of a market distortion. Later we suggest an alternative 
to the minimum wage that can raise wages of limited resource workers while promoting 
employment and international competitiveness. 
2Practices that could raise the payoff from education include rigorous selection for and rewarding 
of competent teachers, more intensive training of teachers in subject matter, standardized testing 
to measure progress and promote competition among schools, more freedom of students 
(parents?) to select schools, demands on students for drill in basics and for more homework, 
greater quantity and quality of preschool education, and more involvement of parents in reading 
to and otherwise preparing their children for school. Greater use of apprenticeship vocational 
training programs in conjunction with the private sector could raise the payoff from vocational 
schooling. Vocational-technical education supported by the public has had a mixed and for the 
most part disappointing record (Training and Jobs, pp. 19-21). If common schools will provide 
better literacy and numeracy, private firms can be counted on to provide on-the-job vocational 
training, helped by the wage supplement discussed later. 
3Reducing soil erosion also reduces water quality problems, other things equal. 
4Hail and selected other types of coverage have been provided successfully by private insurers. 
5Canadian farmers can contribute up to 3 percent of their sales (net of purchased feed and seed, 
and excluding dairy and poultry) matched by a government contribution (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, November 1995, p. 26). In addition farmers can make unmatched contributions up 
to 20 percent of sales, a provision that is little used. Contributions can be made on a maximum 
of Can $250,000 of sales in any one year, and contributions to the stabilization fund must cease 
when the fund reaches 150 percent of a 5-year average of eligible sales. The account receives the 
market interest rate plus a 3 percent interest rate supplement from the government. Withdrawals 
are allowed when net farm income falls below its 5-year average or below Can $10,000. The 
farmer may withdraw all funds to drop out of the program because of retirement or other 
approved reasons. Only government contributions are taxed upon withdrawal. 
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6Farm numbers will diminish approximately 1.5 percent per year and noncommercial farms 
(sales under $100,000 per year) will decline at 2.0 percent per year (Drury and Tweeten, 1995a). 
Commercial farm numbers will grow slowly. Rural farm communities on average will lose 
population, but other rural communities adjacent to cities or dependent on growing retirement, 
higher education, or manufacturing economic bases will prosper. The overall nonmetropolitan 
population will continue to grow. 
7Some of the current tax-expenditure programs are inequitable and inefficient. Tax-free bonds, 
for example, benefit mainly the very rich and encourage public low-yield investment, often in 
competition with the private sector. Subsidies to ethanol and the maritime industry could be 
ended with gains in both equity and efficiency. 
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